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PILOT PERSPECTIVES ON AVOIDING CFIT
Robert M. Jenney
Aviation Safety Connection, Inc.
Reading, MA USA
According to Flight Safety Foundation, Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accidents are a leading cause of
commercial aviation fatalities. CFIT is not selective; it is prevalent in corporate aviation and, all too alarmingly, in
other segments of general aviation. This paper is a pilot-to-pilot conversation specifically about avoiding CFIT and,
in the process, about airmanship. All are invited to listen in.
The Conversation
I know the CFIT statistics and the devastating
consequence of this type of accident but, as a pilot
interested in an aviation career, what can I do to
avoid CFIT?
That’s a difficult question to answer simply. The
body of research is large, much is of the information
is based on actual events and accidents, and good
ideas result. But, the end product doesn’t always
produce specific guidance—that task is often left for
the training departments, instructors and individual
pilots to accomplish.
Let me draw upon the experiences and beliefs of
other pilots, inject my own biases, and examine some
of the thought processes that have proven to be
useful. However, in the end you will need to establish
your own guiding principles and personal standards
on  this  issue  and  others  that  will  define  you  as  an
airman.
How does avoiding CFIT fit into this concept of
airmanship?
First, let’s set the parameters. What is CFIT? Flight
Safety Foundation defines a CFIT accident as, “one
in which an otherwise serviceable aircraft, under the
control of the flight crew, is flown unintentionally
into terrain, obstacles or water, usually with no prior
awareness  on  the  part  of  the  crew  of  the  impending
collision." In short, CFIT is loss of near-ground
position awareness; the airplane is controllable; the
results are fatal.
Position awareness is not a momentary, static
geographic plan view. It’s a three-dimensional
understanding of where you’ve been, where you
are and where you’re going to be. But, we can’t
simply narrow our focus to positional status to grasp
and  deal  with  this  CFIT  problem.  There  are  many
factors involved, and we need to broaden our outlook
to the more encompassing concept of situation
awareness (SA), of which near-ground awareness is a
specific case.
And the complexity of this broader view demands a
high degree of professionalism—airmanship—from
pilots. Airmanship requires confident piloting skills,
sound judgment and a strong sense of personal
accomplishment and well-being. Even with the finest
technical flying skills, poor judgment leads to faulty
decisions and, very likely, to loss of SA.
I’d been thinking of awareness in terms of location
and position. What else is involved?
The varied aspects of flying are widespread and
interrelated. Physically they include the aircraft, its
flight, operating, navigation and communication
systems; the aviation system, its traffic control, its
navigation/communications network and navaids; its
airports, runways and taxiways. Environmentally
they include weather and its uncertainties; severe
weather with its icing, storm cells and microbursts
conditions; restrictions to flight from low ceilings and
limited visibility; turbulence, winds, night conditions,
sun position, etc. In the cockpit our concerns are all
the flight parameters (altitude, airspeed, angle of
attack, G-forces, flight progress, fuel status, etc.).
Personally we deal with aeromedical issues such as
spatial disorientation and illusions, vertigo, hypoxia,
stress and fatigue, and ergonomic factors resulting
from equipment design, control and switch locations,
etc. Plus, personal interactions are many and varied.
These factors influence how well we fly and,
separately and in combination, determine the
situations we need to be aware of.
Situations change, and maintaining awareness in
flight is a dynamic process. In fact, it is an integral
part of what you know as “aeronautical decision
making (ADM).”
OK, so it’s a bit complex. But I’d really like to focus
on my original question. Can’t we get back to CFIT?
Actually, no. Managing risk requires understanding
human fallibility and loss of SA, and understanding
requires effort and patience. We all want to climb in
the cockpit and demonstrate our piloting ability, but
the truth is we may not be as good as we think. There
326
are a number of good and experienced pilots who
have been victims of CFIT—it only takes one
mistake, and every pilot I know admits to mistakes.
Let’s continue. ADM is the process of judgment and
decision making. We exercise judgment based on our
experiences, our biases and pressures we place on
ourselves. Any change that’s perceived requires a
decision. That decision may be to take any number of
different actions, or may be not to act at all. The
quality of your judgment—the option you choose—is
measured by the resulting decision you made. But
that’s not the end. Decisions require action, actions
induce change, and change necessitates judgment.
It’s a continuing feed-forward, feedback process.
I’ll stay with you and try to be patient. Judgment is
selecting options, decision making requires action.
Where does SA fit in?
Remember I said that in terms of SA, pilot’s think of
where they’ve been, where they are and where
there’re going to be? Looking ahead requires
anticipation and some degree of expectation.
At this point let me say that I’ve talked with a
number of pilots and conducted informal surveys on
issues related to SA, and feel I can speak with some
confidence.  You  should  make  an  effort  to  do  the
same because there’s so much that can be learned
from peer interaction.
Another pointer. The first thing I read in a magazine
is letters to the editor—here you get the real-world
opinions. Recently, Professional Pilot conducted a
pilot survey on SA and published the responses.1 If
you carefully read comments like these you’ll get a
good sense of how other pilots think. You won’t
always agree but, again, you’ll need to form your
own opinions over time.
Back to your question on where SA fits in. We need
to get beyond the words and put them in the context
of how you might think and act.
On looking ahead. Anticipating. We prepare for each
flight. We flight plan and consider any number of
factors including weather, winds, fuel consumption,
alternates, approaches, airport characteristics—our
situation list. We brief ourselves and, perhaps, others.
And, we brief in explicit terms, not abstract thoughts.
We develop expectations of what lies ahead.
In flight we alter our expectations to actual events.
How we prepare for and adapt to change varies with
each individual, but I’d like to suggest that a
structured thinking process that can be relied upon is
desirable, particularly under conditions of high
workload. Stress is relieved when we’re confident in
our ability to anticipate problems and deal with them
when they arise. Let’s look at how some pilots think
as they manage their cockpits. They play “what if?”.
Only it’s not a game. It’s a serious management
method that looks at an uncertain future and
postulates alternative versions of that future. It works
in business and works in the cockpit.
“What if?” Scenario building. Let’s see how “what
if?” could work in developing in-flight strategies.
1. Select an issue that you may be confronted with.
A few possibilities: fuel (reserves or
consumption); weather (enroute, at destination, at
alternate); winds aloft; clearance; equipment.
2. Think of two or three possible outcomes (“what
if” scenarios).
3. Think through the implications and work out a
game plan (strategy) for each scenario (“what if—
then…”).
4. Establish a time or place (fix) to review your
issue.
5. Revisit and revise, as necessary, your scenarios
and game plans.
The  “what  if—then…”  process  is  simple  and
straightforward, more difficult to describe than
utilize. Through these steps you have put certain
issues in perspective. You’ve gained greater
awareness of the issues facing your flight. You
haven’t played your hand, but this disciplined form of
thinking better prepares to make choices when you
need to. You won’t have “covered all the bases,” but
you will be able to deal more fully with new issues
that pop-up since you’ve got a few others covered.
These scenarios can be developed by the single pilot,
of course. They will tend to be more thorough in a
cooperative two-pilot team cockpit. That’s at least an
introduction to options and SA. Are you with me?
Yes. I can see that working out in-flight strategies
promotes increased awareness. It also lays out a few
options that might be considered at an appropriate
time. What about decision making and SA?
Other pilots will respect you for your flying ability,
but they will judge you more critically by the
decisions you make. We’ll discuss and emphasize a
few of the finer points, but I’d like to emphasize what
I consider to be key elements. Know your airplane.
Know your mission, visualize it and prepare for it.
Then you’ll be ready for in-flight changes when they
occur. There’s seldom need to rush, so approach your
tasks systematically. Define and set your goals in
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precise terms. Understand that if your expectations
are not clear and your targets vague, then the quality
of your resulting decisions and actions will suffer.
On maintaining control. Making corrections. We
want to keep control of our activities and decisions as
smoothly as we control our aircraft. The familiar
feedback loop is at work—input, output, feedback,
correction. It’s exactly what you do or your autopilot
does for you. Your cockpit management input is what
you want to achieve, your objective, goal or target.
Your output is what you’re actually accomplishing,
your result. The difference between what you want
and what you get is the information feedback you
need to act to get back on target. Clearly, the smaller
the deviation the smoother the correction.
Before we move on, I’d like to emphasize two
important points. One, be committed to your
objective. If you waver in this commitment, then
you’ve given up a measure of control. Your autopilot
is tireless in its commitment to your input. You need
to “stay the course” on your cockpit management
activities as well. Two, set boundaries or tolerances
with respect to your objective. These may be rules set
by your organization or guideposts that you’ve
established for yourself. How much variation are you
willing to accept? For example, we know that
unstabilized approaches lead to CFIT accidents.
Define  clearly  and  set  in  your  own  mind  what  a
stable approach is. Perfect entries are not always
possible, but know at what point you must be stable
(within your predefined tolerances) or break it off.
Stay in charge—control your destiny.
On ADM. Judgment and decision making. Flight
conditions change, and change requires judgment be
exercised. Almost all judgment is intuitive, based on
experience, training, personal beliefs, professional
standards, and the ability to determine right from
wrong. If it weren’t intuitive we’d be bogged down
and unable to function.
The balance of judgment is cognitive. We make a
conscious choice of what to do. It follows, then, that we
want to elevate the more crucial situations to this more
thoughtful level and base our choices on conscious
evaluation. To do this, we look ahead, determine viable
options, anticipate outcomes and select courses of
action. We’re interested in exercising sound judgment,
not necessarily the very best, since it’s impossible to
evaluate and rate all possible options.
Decision making is judgment’s product. The
decision’s objective (target) is defined, progress
towards that objective is monitored (feedback), and
corrective action is taken when necessary to keep the
target in sight. At any one time there might be
multiple decisions in play, so feedback is apt to be
intermittent rather than continuous. The better pilots
are able to keep them all in perspective, checking the
flow of information for each sufficiently to maintain
a state of management control.
It is this information flow—feedback of progress
towards the goal—that establishes and maintains
awareness.  That’s  why  I  say  that  SA  is  an  integral
part of a quality decision process, not a separate,
stand alone characteristic. Good decision making
enhances awareness.
We’ve pretty well summarized the general topic of
situation awareness. Now let’s look at the more
specific nature of near-ground awareness.
Good. I’ve been waiting for this!
Awareness of your surroundings is all the more
crucial at lower altitudes. This is a good time to cover
one other aspect of SA, self awareness. Add it to your
situation awareness list—it’s probably your list’s
most important item.
Self awareness. Self knowledge. We’ve all been
taught aviation’s cardinal rule: “Keep Flying the
Airplane.” We accept its premise. We understand its
logic. Yet, it’s surprising how often this simple rule is
violated and an accident results. We also know we
should act immediately and climb above minimum
safe altitude (MSA) when near-ground position
awareness is lost. But, as you know from your
statistics, too often pilots don’t take this action.
Knowledge of these fundamental behavioral rules is
not enough. It’s not an intellectual exercise. Are you
committed to acting? Will you really do what you
know is right at that crucial moment in time?
Dig deep! Imbed rules such as these in your personal
belief system. Commit yourself to act. “Know
Thyself” as the ancient axiom dictates. Know that
you will act appropriately and decisively when the
time comes. Acquitting the pilot in command’s
responsibility and authority and knowing “the
consequences of your actions”2 requires this type of
individual dedication.
Thanks for the advice. I hadn’t thought of myself as a
pilot in quite those terms.
You’re welcome. It’s easy to fall into the trap of
thinking, “Let’s see what develops—I can handle it.”
On the subject of CFIT, there’s another truth: “In the
battle with Mother Earth, the lady always wins.”
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Let’s move on and cover some CFIT topics. You
know the other contraction, CFTT (for controlled
flight towards terrain). No accident results, but an
accident might have occurred if evasive action had
not been taken. These are real learning experiences
that unquestionably have changed the subsequent
behaviors of those involved. One pilot told me:
“I  realized  it  just  in  time.  It  was  scary,  but  there’s
been instant improvement of SA from then on.”
They can be learning experiences for you as well. A
search of the ASRS database using “CFTT or CFIT”
will produce well over 100 incidents. If you
selectively read a few, get a real sense of the
circumstances and mentally place yourself in the
cockpit, you’ll be able to learn a great deal and
benefit from the mistakes of others.
And  talk  to  other  pilots.  As  I  said,  there’s  a  huge
database of aviation knowledge in the minds of
others who do what you do. In my informal survey I
found that, on a pilot-to-pilot basis, pilots are willing
to share their experiences openly and honestly. We
don’t have this type of conversation often enough.
I agree. I’ve learned a great deal from my
colleagues, and it’s a great feeling to know I can call
on more experienced pilots for advice. So many are
willing to be informal mentors.
That’s one rewarding aspect of our industry. As I said
earlier, pilots are usually forthright in acknowledging
mistakes: “Be aware that everyone makes mistakes
and cannot operate at their best on all occasions.”
Now, to a few specific CFIT/CFTT topics:
CFIT themes. Crew behavior patterns. One pilot who
is  concerned  with  the  CFIT  issue  sent  me  his
observations, as follows:3 “From my experiences of
investigating CFIT accidents I have seen the
following common themes involving situation
awareness and crew monitoring.
A. The crews saw something—the ground or non-
aeronautical lights were misinterpreted. In most
of these accidents, the crews were not adhering to
the definitions of MDA/IMC, or not aware of the
precise visual requirements for a land decision.
B. Both crew members were comfortable with their
navigation position and/or their actions, they both
made the same assessment and/or the same
mistake, thus the cross monitoring function failed.
C. The circumstances did not enable any monitoring;
the monitoring pilot remained head down and
could not see what the captain was describing
(ground contact). The flying pilot had made an
error, but the monitoring pilot did not/could
not/would not detect it.
D. There are covert peer pressures due to the
expectations of the industry. I.e., a go-around
carries a professional stigma—ATC sees it, other
pilots comment, management wants to know why.
In these accidents the crew formed an opinion of
the airfield/flight conditions and briefed for that
plan; they were unable/unwilling to change their
plan as the real conditions unfolded—situation
awareness/decision-making.”
To be effective, CFIT prevention needs to take into
account these and other identifiable themes and
derive appropriate countermeasures. It’s advisable to
keep in mind that many CFIT accidents occur near
airports over relatively flat ground, not necessarily
rugged terrain.
Another good introduction to CFIT is the Flight
Safety Foundation’s video, complete with accident
recreations.4 It reports that fatalities are greatest in
the transport category with air taxis providing the
highest rate, and that frequent accidents occur in the
approach phase with multiple step-down approaches
being prominent.
When you view the video it you will see the effects
of scud running (by two very experienced pilots), an
accident due to black hole illusion on a straight-in
approach, and the result of confusing ATC clearances
with communications conducted by parties who had
different primary languages. The concluding
message: acknowledge vulnerability and be vigilant.
You seem to have given me homework assignments!
Strictly voluntary, but passive classroom attendance
isn’t enough to understanding the problem and
developing your own behavioral guidelines. Now,
let’s be more specific.
Personal standards. Integrity. We started this
conversation during the self awareness discussion.
Here are a few of the specific commitments pilots
make to themselves when regard to terrain avoidance:
“You really have to stick to your standards and not
cave in to pressure from others in the cabin.”
“I never do circling approaches at night in low
visibility if there are any obstructions in the area.”
“Go-around or climb if you’re ever in doubt.”5
“A landing is an approach without a go-around,
mentally preparing the GA as the escape maneuver.”
“A go-around is present in my mind throughout the
approach.  In  fact,  go-around  is  my  aim  until  the
situation is suitable for landing.”
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The concept that landing is a go-around interrupted
by a decision to land is a valuable insight that appears
to be gaining acceptance.
Preparation. Flight planning. The need for mental
preparation is obvious, but a quick review doesn’t
hurt.  Plus,  there  are  a  few  good  pointers  in  pilot
comments and thoughts to keep in mind:
“Even when solo I give myself a detailed briefing,
particularly on airport characteristics and obstacles.”
“Gather information, as much as you can, about the
flight to improve situation awareness.”
“I study the VFR sectional, even though most of my
flying is on IFR flight plans.”
“I look for certain clues to the presence of
obstacles—displaced thresholds, circling minima that
vary with the category of the aircraft, circling
restrictions, departure procedures.”
“Non-precision approaches need special briefing
attention.”
“Being an east coast pilot, I think any airport above
sea level deserves my full attention.”
Pilots understand the need to be aware of hazard
potential.  However,  many  don’t  think  of  CFIT  as
distinct and separate issue since, with proper
preparation, terrain and obstacles are part of the
normal flight environment:
“My concept is that CFIT/terrain awareness must be
embedded in everyday activities and is not a ‘special’
or bolt-on activity.”
“Most of my routes are into areas of high ground and
prone to heavy rain and poor visibility, so terrain
separation is an every day exercise.”
Options. Judgment’s choices. Here are a few
additional pilot thoughts that complement our earlier
scenario development topic:
“Think “what if” and apply everything you’ve
learned.”6
“I always ask myself what I would do if a situation
happened right now.”7
“My basic principle is always have a solid gold plan
B, maybe a plan C as well, and not to let risks
compound with each other.”
“Review all aspects of descent and approach during
cruise and be sure to discuss all options.”8
“Good SA involves being both physically and
mentally aware … and what options are available
should something go awry.”9
Well, I seem to be getting good points to think about.
Yes,  I  think  you  are  from  your  fellow  pilots.  Next,
you’ll get their view of a really critical issue, stable
approaches, and setting specific targets during the
approach to maintain cockpit management control.
Stabilized approach. Crucial to terrain avoidance.
Inviolable rules and clear thinking are the hallmarks
for maintaining control during approaches.
We won’t get into great detail here, but pilots do
establish defined tolerances for approach entries, the
point the aircraft must be properly configured, the
point at which they are stable within their boundaries
(speed, rate of descent, +/- GS/LOC dots, etc.). A few
related thoughts, but we’re barely touching this
important subject:
“A stabilized approach is my safety net.”
“On a typical ILS approach, I get it fully configured
and stabilized by 800 AGL or earlier. On non-
precision approaches I try to be fully stabilized
beginning at the FAF.”
“I adhere to the stabilized approach philosophy and
approach gate concept.”
When flying alone, many pilots brief themselves and
make altitude callouts through the intercom. It’s not
loneliness—it comes from the knowledge that
speaking out loud makes each thought more concrete
and specific, less abstract.
“During  an  approach  I  try  to  verbalize  what  is
happening, even to myself if I am alone in the plane.”
And, as with “what if?”, asking and answering
questions is a proven method of defining the situation
more clearly than observing events taking place. Here
is how one general aviation pilot maintains a stable
approach and position awareness:
“I  think  about  each  segment  of  the  approach  using
three questions: (i) ‘how low?’; (ii) ‘how far?’; (iii)
‘what's next?’.” By answering these questions he’s
establishing specific targets that he’ll be able to
measure his performance by.
We can all learn from this pilot’s thoughtful and
thorough technique. Few pilots I know have
developed as comprehensive method for asking and
answering questions that give confidence they’re in
control of their flight.
I do see the value of Q & A for position awareness as
well as the earlier development of scenarios. I’ll give
techniques like these a great deal more thought.
Good. Let’s briefly mention a few more topics related
to CFIT/CFTT and perhaps expand on them later.
Sterile cockpit. Minimizing distracts. It’s said that
regulations are “written with blood” as an after-the-
fact response to dramatic events. That’s probably
how this concept became a requirement for Part 121
cockpits. The idea is to aid SA by minimizing
distractions and interruptions during crucial phases of
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flight and, although not required, others have adopted
versions of the sterile cockpit concept.
Here’s a summary of the regulation: No flight
crewmember may perform any duties during a critical
phase of flight except those required for the safe
operation of the aircraft. Critical phases of flight
include all flight operations conducted below 10,000
feet, except cruise flight.10
And, here are ways that sterile cockpit is interpreted:
Transport category: Sterile cockpit below 10,000 feet
(per regulation).
Corporate training program: “A sterile cockpit will be
maintained during dynamic (non-cruise) flight.”11
GA pilot: “I observe sterile cockpit rules within 40
miles of the destination.”
Helicopter pilot: “Keeping good SA involves
disregarding distractions such as passenger chatter
and staying connected with what’s going on inside
the cockpit.”12
Sterile cockpit is an important rule for all near-
ground operations—it’s certainly advisable for
general aviation pilots to conduct this briefing with
their passengers.
Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA). A  primary  SA
threshold. It’s the altitude that’s established to
provide at least 1,000 feet of clearance above the
highest obstacle in a near-airport sector. Pilots
develop rules and have definite thoughts about how
to use this information, a few of which follow:
“The MSA is the tip of the iceberg on being aware of
what hazards lie around the airport.”
“Do not fly below MSA unless under radar control or
established on a charted approach, or visual–VMC.”
“Situational awareness is knowing … your MSAs and
having all cockpit instrumentation set up for what’s
going to happen over the next 5 to 10 minutes.”13
“If you are vectored or directed by ATC out of the
routine,  MSA is  a  good guide  to  use  to  be  at  a  safe
and clear altitude from the terrain.”
“MSAs should be included in approach and departure
briefings with the intensions of how to use them.”
I’m with you on MSA. What about terrain warning
systems?
That’s  a  good  question  since  MSA  factors  into
automated CFIT avoidance. For now, let’s just talk
about EGPWS, enhanced ground proximity warning
systems. First, a word of caution:
“In today’s high tech world it’s really easy to become
complacent.”14
There’s no question that pilots need to find ways to
stay mentally active and involved in automated flight.
EGPWS. Terrain/obstacle warning. Briefly:
“With a Red ‘pull up’ warning, pull up immediately
and climb to MSA (not when the warning stops).”
“Practice the pull up maneuver in the simulator;
know the aircraft’s capabilities and remember the feel
of the aircraft.”
“We practice CFIT scenarios in the simulator besides
the classroom discussions.”
Terrain warning systems have proven effective in
reducing CFIT but, regarding the pull up maneuver:
“The evidence from incidents is that the aircraft is
only maneuvered sufficient to stop the warning.”
We discussed the need for personal standards
earlier—the commitment to performing escape
maneuvers is the same as that for go-arounds.
Situation awareness seems to have many facets.
Yes, there’s much to appreciate. Now, before leaving
the avionics topic, let me mention two other
equipment applications. First, as you’re aware, the
non-precision approach is the ultimate challenge in a
hazard-filled environment. One pilot recommends
use of the radio altimeter (if one is installed) during
non-precision approaches, and has established
specific operating and readout guidelines. Although
the box is far less sophisticated, the same pull up and
escape commitment applies. Second, a helicopter
pilot  uses  radar  at  low  level  “as  a  means  of
establishing a clear path ahead” and, in addition,
“demands precision in maintaining radar altimeter
heights.” Just a reminder of an earlier point—know
your systems and how to operate them effectively.
I can see that technology is a complex topic that
requires more intensive discussion. Have we covered
the CFIT spectrum?
Pretty much. But there is one other subject I’d like to
close with that’s not so procedurally oriented. After
you’ve flow for a while you get a real feel for the
airplane. It’s as though you and your airplane have
come together as a single unit functioning
effortlessly. I’m sure you know the feeling, and
there’s a confident awareness associated with it.
Many pilots also develop a feel for the flight ahead as
they gather information and brief for it. They actually
form mental pictures of what lies ahead—they
visualize situations, places, events—and, in flight,
use all their senses to “see” what’s happening.
“Vision.” Using  all  your  senses.  Pilots  develop  a
heightened awareness by experiencing their
environment, and express it this way:
“Situational awareness means referring to your
surroundings to get the big picture.”15
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“For  me,  SA  is  knowing  what  your  mission  is  and
staying focused on it.”16
“We need to use all of our senses to evaluate what’s
happening in the environment around us.”17
“Situational awareness mandates you use your total
senses to monitor flight parameters at all times.”18
“I use all my senses to keep aware … you’ll find your
backside works great for identifying unusual
vibrations or aircraft movements.”19
“Situational awareness means being aware of your
surroundings. [Clues] can be anything from avionics
inputs to engine sounds, air noise, vibrations or lack
thereof, and even aircraft smells”20
“An important part of SA is maintaining a good
listening watch on the radio, especially in the
terminal areas.”21
And, as for taking action, trust your gut instincts.
“The nagging feeling that something is not quite right
is often unfailing in its precision. … If you get a gut
feeling, respond to it, don’t ignore it.”22 Good advice
that wraps it up.
Thank you. You’ve helped me to gain a deeper
understanding of—perhaps even a feel for—situation
awareness and avoiding CFIT.
Postscript
The primary goal of this paper is to stress the value of
pilot-to-pilot interaction and communication,
particularly on the issue of near-ground operations.
Knowing that individual pilots have learned much
from their training and experiences and developed
personal rules of conduct that serve them, I
conducted an informal CFIT avoidance survey with
subscribers to Aviation.Org. Respondents are from
many countries (including Turkey, Malaysia and The
Netherlands) and have different experience levels and
backgrounds. The results from a Professional Pilot
survey added still another dimension.
Regulations, company policies, standardized
procedures, etc. are necessary and desirable but, if we
listen, those in the operating arena can fill in the gaps
and provide added insight, not only to other pilots but
to all in aviation.
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